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THE INCUMBENCY “REQUIREMENT” IN THE
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT OF 1947:
POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
James Ronan*
Much of what we do in studying the Succession Act1 or anything with this
issue is always done in a reactive sense: this happened, and so we react to it.
Being able to do this in a proactive sense is certainly much needed and would
be greatly appreciated. I’ll be talking today about the requirement for
resignation under the line of succession statute.
If the Speaker of the House or Senate president pro tempore served as
acting president, Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution would require them
to resign their previous positions.2 Now, the provision itself is not
controversial. I haven’t heard any viable arguments that someone in
Congress should be able to hold dual positions. The removal aspect of the
statute with respect to lawmakers is really not under consideration here.
What the issue presents is that it actually places the Speaker and Senate pro
tempore in a position that I feel is unfair.
It is not so much hypothetical, because I’m going to use the example of the
Reagan assassination attempt, but to place the Speaker and the Senate pro
tempore in this position, the following would occur. One, let’s assume again
a dual vacancy; there’s been some type of attack, health crisis, what have
you, and the president and vice president, or both, are incapacitated. Now, I
say incapacitated because had they died, that makes the decision a little easier
for the Speaker or Senate pro tempore, notwithstanding, of course, the
dangers of the bumping provision, which Rick Cinquegrana discussed.3
What if a president or vice president is disabled? Well, the Speaker of the
House or Senate president pro tempore are then faced with a very difficult
* Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Villanova University; Author, Living Dangerously:
The Uncertainties of Presidential Disability and Succession. These remarks were delivered
as part of the program entitled The Presidential Succession Act at 75: Praise It or Bury It?,
which was held on April 6, 2022, and hosted by the Fordham University School of Law. This
transcript has been edited, primarily to conform with the Fordham Law Review’s publication
requirements, and represents the speaker’s individual views alone.
1. Presidential Succession Act, 3 U.S.C. § 19.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
3. See generally Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Bumping Provisions of the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947: Policy and Constitutional Considerations, 91 FORDHAM L. REV.
ONLINE 33 (2022).
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proposition. Do they choose to resign their position to assume the
presidency? How long will they be assuming the presidency? We simply
don’t know. How long will the disability last? How long will the president
or vice president be incapacitated?
You can imagine that if they are asked to resign their position to serve for
a period of hours or something like that, most, if not all, would decline. As
we also know with health crises, things can change very rapidly. What if
later on a president or vice president who was assumed to be temporarily
disabled turned out to have a prolonged disability? Certainly, that would
change the lawmakers’ calculus.
The other aspect this brings into play with the resignation requirement is
that, along with placing the Speaker in an interim position, it also places the
Senate president pro tempore in a very precarious political position. The
Speaker would have to resign. Now a Speaker cannot merely return to the
Speaker’s chair after their time in office serving as acting president has
ended. They would face the realization that they would have to run perhaps
in a special election at some point, or for re-election, to return to their House
seat and then potentially supplant a new Speaker, because, of course, a new
Speaker would be selected. That’s not to say it couldn’t happen, but it is to
say it’s by no means a sure thing and it would place the former Speaker in a
difficult position of having to accomplish those things.
Now, with the Senate president pro tempore it’s a bit different. The
president pro tempore’s Senate seat can, under most states’ laws, be filled by
a state governor,4 so the assumption might be that the state’s governor would
merely appoint the senator who had resigned to serve as acting president in a
time of national crisis. However, the impact of partisanship must be
considered. What would occur if a governor and president pro tempore who
had resigned are from different parties? This would then present that state
governor with a chance to maybe swing the composition of the Senate. We
need look no further than the Senate right now, with a fifty-fifty split. With
any potential change, we would imagine any state governor, even if they
chose to be bipartisan and maybe had it in their heart to just reappoint the
Senator in question, we can imagine the pressure they would face from their
party, and from party leaders in the state and in all fifty states, pressuring
them to say: “No, here’s our chance. Perhaps we can gain a majority.”
It really places the Speaker of the House and the Senate president pro
tempore in an unfair position. They have to act quickly. They may not have
all the facts. They may not have a full understanding of what’s going on.
And they are being asked to make a monumental decision without any real
chance for deliberation.
As an example of this, I want to take a look at the uncertainty surrounding
the Reagan assassination attempt on March 30, 1981. Now at the time, of
4. Filling Vacancies in the U.S. Senate, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Filling_vacancies_in_the_U.S._Senate [https://perma.cc/5WEF-DPT9] (last visited Nov. 3,
2022) (showing that, in thirty-seven states, vacancies in the Senate are temporarily filled by
gubernatorial appointment).
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course, as fate would have it, Vice President George H.W. Bush was on Air
Force Two.5 The communications were very spotty.6 There was a problem
reaching him.7 Logically, the next in the line of succession was Speaker
Thomas “Tip” O’Neill and Senate President Pro Tempore Strom Thurmond.
Now, we really don’t see any evidence that this was considered, but you can
imagine the complete lack of appeal to Speaker O’Neill if someone went to
him and said: “Would you care to resign to serve essentially in a caretaker
position perhaps for an hour or two until Vice President Bush returns and, if
needed, assume the presidency?” Again, it’s hard to believe a Speaker would
resign their position, in particular one as powerful as Tip O’Neill, or any
contemporary Speaker, just merely to assume the presidency for a period of
a few hours.
Let’s go to the Senate president pro tempore. There’s no evidence that
Strom Thurmond was approached, but had he acted as president, the governor
of South Carolina at that time was a Democrat. Potentially, you would have
had the chance of a governor choosing to improve their party’s fortunes,
perhaps nominating a Democrat. What would that have meant for Strom
Thurmond’s career in the Senate? Again, there’s no evidence that took place,
but that lack of evidence doesn’t preclude the problems presented.
The problem that did manifest itself during the aftermath of the Reagan
assassination attempt obviously involved Secretary of State Alexander Haig
going to the podium and declaring, “I am in [charge] here,” and misstating
the line of succession.8 To give Haig a little bit of, not excuse, but maybe a
little bit of cover for that, Haig mentioned, and others in the Situation Room
that day remarked as well, about Larry Speakes’s remarks to the press.9
Speakes, the acting press secretary, was thrust into duty because of the injury
to James Brady during the attack on Reagan. He appeared very unsure of his
answers and was not clear on who was in charge.10 Haig took it upon himself
to say, look, the nation, the world needs to know someone is in charge here:
“I am in [charge] here, in the White House, pending return of the vice
president . . . .”11 We have the very infamous quote. In Haig’s defense, he
really was placed in a position of no one being quite sure who was in charge.
Again, there is no evidence that the Speaker and the president pro tempore
were approached, and, even if they were, it is impossible to imagine they
would’ve taken the opportunity to serve as acting president. That creates that
period of instability and danger that we can see with both a legislative line of
succession and also this resignation requirement. There’s simply no recourse
for a temporary change, as we would see with Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth

5. See DEL QUINTIN WILBUR, RAWHIDE DOWN: THE NEAR ASSASSINATION OF RONALD
REAGAN 131 (2011).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 173–75.
9. See id. at 171–73.
10. See id. at 171–74.
11. Id. at 175.
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Amendment, for a Speaker to perhaps step aside from their position to serve
and then return to the speakership or as a president pro tempore later on.12
Presidents have faced divided government. Every president since Richard
Nixon, with the exception of Jimmy Carter throughout his term and Joe Biden
of course with the midterm election still pending, has faced not only an
opposition of Congress but an opposition Speaker. This is not just a scenario
where five or ten different things would have to happen for such an event to
take place. This is a scenario that is likely to happen. The numbers bear that
out. There is much more of a likelihood of a president facing a Speaker of a
different party.
We also run into an issue with any potential health crisis. Of course, we
may have seen instances of this with President Trump and the COVID
diagnosis back in 2020.13
How forthcoming is any presidential
administration going to be with a potential health crisis? Now, add to that
fact the potentiality of perhaps a Speaker of the House from the opposition
party assuming the presidency. There almost appears to be more of a benefit,
for lack of a better term, for a president or an administration to attempt to
cover up, or perhaps not be as forthcoming as we would like about, their
medical conditions.
To conclude, the 1947 Act certainly has a number of provisions that are
beneficial, but the resignation requirement is one that presents a danger: one,
for the shift in party control, which several of the other speakers have done a
great job of mentioning; also, the resignation requirement that, with an
incapacitated president and vice president, a Speaker or president pro
tempore might refuse to serve as the acting president. Then imagine things
change—perhaps that’s not going to be a brief period of dual incapacity and
maybe their calculus changes. It’s not to say the Cabinet line of succession
is perfect by any stretch, but it is certainly safer in this regard.

12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
13. See Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, Trump Tests Positive for the Coronavirus, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/us/politics/trump-covid.html
[https://perma.cc/8Q6G-T9UM] (Dec. 31, 2020).

